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Essay
Original Expectations
MARK A. GRABER
Professor Kay’s increasingly lonely crusade for interpreting constitutional
provisions in light of their original intentions captures how constitutions should be
implemented immediately after ratification, with the important proviso that
expectations matter as much as intentions. Insisting that the constitution on day
one mandates X, even though everyone responsible for the constitution thought the
constitution mandated not X, violates common sense. A jurisprudence of original
intentions at day one acknowledges that constitutions are political documents that
serve political purposes and avoids making linguistic theory the practical arbiter
when debates break out over impeachment procedures, the regulation of slavery,
and the status of state sovereign immunity. At day one, Professor Kay’s
originalism best captures the constitutional commitment to rule of law and the
underlying constitutional politics of ratification. Intentions and expectations guide
the planning processes facilitated by the rule of law. Framers, at least in the
United States, spend far more energy making predictions about how the
Constitution will work than in laying out the meaning of particular phrases. The
persons responsible for a constitution focus on intentions and expectations rather
than meanings because their concern is with how the constitution as a whole will
work and not with the best interpretation of a particular constitutional clause.
The reasons for preferring original intentions/expectations to original public
meanings at day one provides grounds for abandoning all originalisms at day ten.
If original public meaning cedes too much constitutional authority to linguists at
the moment of ratification, both original public meaning and original
intentions/expectations cede too much constitutional authority to historians over
time. Doctrinalism at day ten better captures the constitutional commitment to rule
of law than any form of originalism. When planning, people are far more likely to
assume that constitutional decision makers will continue to do what they are doing
than base decisions on original public meanings that may be unknown to both the
planners and constitutional decision makers. Purposivism at day ten better
incorporates constitutional developments—particularly those constitutional
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developments ratifiers did not anticipate—than either original public meaning or
original intentions/expectations.
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Original Expectations
MARK A. GRABER *
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional politics in Fredonia1 is structured by the excellent and
widespread use of digital technologies. The Constitution of Fredonia was
ratified by a popular referendum an hour after the final version of that text
was approved by the constitutional convention that drafted that
constitution. This ratification procedure had previously been approved by
the people by a process that was remarkably consistent with every known
consent theory. The conventional debates were public, followed intensely,
and discussed in great detail in ways that left no segment of the Fredonian
population believing that they lacked the time or information necessary to
consider their ratification vote. Article I of the Constitution of Fredonia
provides that the delegates at the constitutional convention will
immediately upon ratification become the legislature of Fredonia.2 This
provision was well known and adequately debated by both the members of
the constitutional convention and by the general public. Remarkably, the
final Constitution of Fredonia is almost identical to that of 1787. The only
exceptions are the above provision in Article I, the inclusion of Article III,
which is identical to the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and a provision in Article V of the Constitution of Fredonia,
that declares “this Constitution shall not be amended until ten years have
passed after ratification.”3
The first debates in the Fredonian legislature, which began the
afternoon the people ratified the constitution, revealed several related
problems. Each concerned a divergence between what members of the
Fredonian legislature agreed was the original public meaning of a
*
Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Thanks to Yaniv Roznai,
Richard Kay, and the members of the symposium honoring Professor Kay’s exceptional work, and to
Adam Kuegler and Alexandria Madjeric for their patient editing.
1
Fredonia is the fictional country in the Marx Brothers movie, DUCK SOUP (Paramount Pictures
1933).
2
See CONSTITUTION FOR THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF
AMERICA, in 5 THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
CONFEDERATE STATES 94, 94 (Mark A. Graber & Howard Gillman eds., 2018) (describing similar
provisions in the Confederate Constitution).
3
See RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: MAKING, BREAKING, AND CHANGING
CONSTITUTIONS 204–05 (2019) (discussing the existence of similar provisions in several national
constitutions).
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particular constitutional provision and what members of the Fredonian
legislature agreed were the original expectations of the Fredonian people
when they ratified the constitution.4 Article I, Section 3, paragraphs 3 and 5
plainly mandate that the Vice President shall preside over the Senate when
the Senate determines whether to convict an impeached Vice President.5
Nevertheless, no Fredonian intended, anticipated, or expected that the
constitution would permit any person to be a judge in their trial,
impeachment or otherwise. Article I, Section 8, paragraph 3 plainly
mandates that Congress may regulate interstate commerce. Fredonians
agree: that the interstate slave trade is interstate commerce; that
prohibitions on commerce are forms of regulation;6 that a good faith
constitutional interpreter could conclude that original public meaning of
the commerce clause sanctions legislation regulating purely in-state
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce;7 and that
slavery has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Nevertheless, no
Fredonian intended, anticipated, or expected that the constitution would
permit the Fredonian legislature to forbid immediately the interstate slave
trade or prohibit human bondage throughout the land.8 Article III plainly
mandates that citizens of a state may sue their home state when making a
claim “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made.”9 Nevertheless, Fredonians intended, anticipated, or
expected that no state could be sued in federal or state court without the
permission of that state.10
How Fredonians should make these constitutional choices depends on
the proper resolution of a longstanding debate between proponents of
original public meanings and proponents of original intentions. Most
contemporary originalists claim that constitutional provisions mean what
4

The claims below about the original meaning and original intention of the Constitution of
Fredonia are stipulations. Whether Americans in 1787 had the same expectations or the same
understanding of the original public meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions is beyond the
scope of this Paper. See infra notes 36–42 (noting these debates in the American context).
5
For this issue in the United States, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told
Spiro Agnew, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 75, 75 (William N.
Eskridge Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998); Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His
Own Impeachment Trial?: A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 849 (2000).
6
See United States v. William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614, 621 (D. Mass. 1808) (discussing how the
government may abridge commerce in the interest of regulation).
7
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that the commerce clause allows for
the regulation of any instate activities with substantial effect on interstate commerce).
8
For this issue in the United States, see Randy E. Barnett, From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief
Justice: The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653, 654
(2013); MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 116 (2006).
9
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
10
For this issue in the United States, see John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1422 (1975).
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the language of the provision meant to the general public the moment the
provision was ratified.11 The Constitution of Fredonia, interpreted from this
perspective, plainly mandates that the Vice President of the United States
presides when the Senate determines whether to convict an impeached
Vice President, plainly vests Congress with the power to regulate the
interstate slave trade, arguably vests Congress with the power to prohibit
slavery throughout the land, and plainly authorizes the national legislature
to give federal courts jurisdiction over suits between a citizen and that
citizen’s unconsenting home state. Professor Richard Kay and many
members of the previous generation of originalists claim that constitutional
provisions mean what the framers of those provisions intended or expected
the moment the provision was ratified.12 The Constitution of Fredonia,
interpreted from this perspective, does not mandate that the Vice President
preside over the Senate when the Senate is determining whether to convict
an impeached Vice President, does not permit the First Congress to ban
either the interstate slave trade or prohibit slavery throughout the land, and
does not authorize the national legislature to give federal courts jurisdiction
over suits between a citizen and that citizen’s unconsenting home state.
The divergence between original public meaning and original
intentions/expectations that Fredonians are experiencing must occur the
instant the constitution is ratified. Both original public meaning and
original intentions/expectations purport to be facts about constitutional
politics at the time the constitution was ratified. Proponents of original
public meaning champion the “fixation thesis.” This thesis maintains that
the original public meaning of a text is fixed at publication or, in the case
of a constitution, at ratification.13 The original public meaning of Article I,
Section 3, the Commerce Clause, and Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution of Fredonia are the public meaning of those provisions when
they were ratified. What people intend or expect at a certain time is also a
historical fact. Constitutional ratifiers may subsequently change their
minds or revise expectations in light of new evidence. Nevertheless, their
public intentions/expectations at the moment of ratification fixes the
original intention/expectation of the constitution, just as their physical
11
See ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 2–3 (2011) (“Although the first generation of originalists focused on the original intentions of
the framers, contemporary originalists believe that the original meaning of the Constitution is the
meaning that the words and phrases had (or would have had) to ordinary members of the public.”).
12
See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229–36 (1988) (laying out the nature of original
intentions adjudication and describing the author’s model as one which “calls for judges to apply the
rules of the written constitution in the sense in which those rules were understood by the people who
enacted them.”).
13
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (“The meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when each
provision is framed and ratified . . . .”).
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position at the time of ratification fixes forever where they were when the
constitution was ratified. The original intentions/expectations respecting
who presides over the trial of an impeached Vice President, congressional
power to regulate slavery, and state sovereign immunity are what
Fredonians intended or expected when they ratified the Constitution of
Fredonia. If, therefore, both original public meaning and original
intentions/expectations are facts about constitutional politics at the moment
of ratification, then any divergence between the two must occur at
ratification.
Original public meaning and original intention/expectations are the
only means for interpreting a constitution at day one. At day one, public
meaning originalism and textualism are identical. Some textualists insist
that the plain meaning of a constitutional text may change over time,14 but
no time has elapsed for that change to occur. Independent doctrinal
analysis at day one is impossible. No binding precedents exist that deviate
from either original public meaning or public intention/expectation.15
Various forms of purposivism at day one collapse into original intentions
or expectations. Dworkin’s distinction between concepts and
conceptions,16 for example, occurs only over time. Ratifiers at day one
believe that the best conception of the concept of equal protection is the
conception they had of equal protection when the constitution was ratified.
Constitutions must live a bit for living constitutionalists to come to believe
that the best application of a general constitutional provision diverges from
that intended or expected by the framers.
Part I of this Essay defends at day one Professor Kay’s increasingly
lonely crusade for interpreting constitutional provisions in light of their
original intentions. Insisting that the constitution on day one mandates X—
even though everyone responsible for the constitution thought the
constitution mandated not X—violates common sense. A jurisprudence of
original intentions at day one acknowledges that constitutions are political
14

See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 3 (1991) (claiming that a textualist may interpret constitutional provisions
in ways that “need not have been present in the conscious minds of the framers”).
15
Constitutional decision makers may choose to borrow from other regimes, but binding
precedents are limited to decisions made interpreting the national constitutional, none of which at day
one have been made. To the extent Fredonians at day one maintain that the Constitution of Fredonia
should be interpreted consistently with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, they
are making either an original public meaning argument (the average Fredonian understood the meaning
of constitutional provisions to be as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States) or an
original intention/expectation argument (the average Fredonian intended or expected that Fredonian
decision makers would be guided by the Supreme Court of the United States). See Jamal Greene, Rule
Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1641–43 (2016) (providing a discussion of original public
meaning and original expectations).
16
See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6
(1987) (“Liberty and equality . . . are concepts that admit of different interpretations or conceptions.”).
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documents that serve political purposes and avoids making linguistic
theory the practical arbiter when debates break out over impeachment
procedures, the regulation of slavery, and the status of state sovereign
immunity. At day one, Professor Kay’s originalism best captures the
constitutional commitment to rule of law and the underlying constitutional
politics of ratification. Intentions and expectations guide the planning
processes facilitated by the rule of law. Framers, at least in the United
States, spend far more energy making predictions about how the
constitution will work than in laying out the meaning of particular phrases.
The persons responsible for a constitution focus on intentions and
expectations rather than meanings, because their concern is with how the
constitution as a whole will work and not with the best interpretation of a
particular constitutional clause.
Part II maintains that the reasons for preferring original
intentions/expectations to original public meanings at day one provides
grounds for abandoning all originalisms at day ten. If original public
meaning cedes too much constitutional authority to linguists at the moment
of ratification, both original public meaning and original
intentions/expectations cede too much constitutional authority to historians
over time. Doctrinalism17 at day ten better captures the constitutional
commitment to rule of law than any form of originalism. People, when
planning, are far more likely to assume that constitutional decision makers
will continue to do what they are doing than base decisions on original
public meanings that may be unknown to both the planners and
constitutional decision makers. Purposivism, which encompasses
structuralism and aspirationalism,18 at day ten better incorporates
constitutional developments, particularly those constitutional developments
ratifiers did not anticipate, than either original public meaning or original
intentions/expectations.
This Essay breaks from almost all forms of originalism by highlighting
the importance of original expectations.19 Expectations, the following
pages suggest, are the stuff of constitutional politics. Expectations at day
one provide the foundation for constitutional practice. People ratify a
constitution on the basis of expectations about how the constitution will
work. That the framers expected a certain result is, therefore, a reason at
day one for constitutionally mandating that result. Much constitutional
17
For a brief outline of doctrinalism, see MARK A. G RABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 78–81 (2013).
18
For a brief outline of purposivism, see id. at 81–83, 85–86.
19
For originalist objections to a jurisprudence of original expectations, see Lawrence B. Solum,
Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 414 (2009) (arguing that the
“linguistic meaning . . . of a text” is different from “expectations about the application of that
meaning”); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–97
(2007) (discussing the difference between “original meaning” and “original expected application”).
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debate is a consequence of constitutions failing to perform as expected. A
jurisprudence that begins with original expectations will not resolve our
contemporary constitutional problems, but is more likely to identify their
cause than a jurisprudence that purposes to resolve contemporary problems
by returning to the constitution in pristine form oblivious to how the
constitution operating in pristine form is creating those problems.
I. ORIGINAL INTENTIONS/EXPECTATIONS AND ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
AT DAY ONE
Common sense dictates interpreting political documents at day one
consistent with their original intentions or expectations. If the United
States and Russia conclude an arms agreement that both parties expect will
obligate each party to dismantle a particular weapon system, then that
agreement should be interpreted as obligating each party to dismantle that
weapon system, even if, on inspection, that result may not be mandated by
the original public meaning of any provision in the treaty. The United
States and Russia concluded the agreement because they anticipated that
result. Interpreting the agreement in light of the original public meaning of
treaty provisions when those treaty provisions diverge from the original
expectations of the treaty would defeat the point of the agreement. The
arms agreement is unlikely to survive one party unilaterally declaring they
are not to be bound by the original intended expectation.
Common sense dictates that the same originalist principles should
govern how constitutions are interpreted at day one. People ratify a
constitution because they expect certain outcomes. Fredonians anticipated
that an impeached Vice President would not preside over his or her Senate
trial, that Congress would not ban the slave trade or slavery, and that states
would not be sued without their permission. Constitutions are likely to
malfunction immediately at day one if interpreted consistently with their
original public meaning rather than original intentions/expectations.
Interpreting Article I, Section 3 consistently with that provision’s original
public meaning will immunize the Vice President of Fredonia from official
sanction until the provision forbidding new constitutional amendments
expires. States in Fredonia may face bankruptcy if Article III of the
national constitution is not interpreted consistently with their anticipated
immunity from private lawsuits for monetary damages. Justice may
demand that states honor their contracts,20 but Fredonians committed to the
rule of law will note that all parties to those contracts understood when
they were made that Fredonian states had to consent to any lawsuit for
nonpayment.

20

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 456 (1793).
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Slavery highlights the importance of treating constitutions as political
documents. Prominent public meaning originalists in the United States
celebrate those abolitionists who pointed out that, as a matter of original
public meaning, the Constitution could easily be interpreted as
anti-slavery. Randy Barnett urges contemporary constitutional theorists to
take their cues from Lysander Spooner, who used a version of original
public meaning to conclude that slavery was always unconstitutional in the
United States.21 The political problem with Spooner’s original public
meaning is that no southern framer at day one would have tolerated such
an interpretation for an instant. Lysander Spooner’s constitution was not
the Constitution most Americans thought they were ratifying in 1787, even
if Spooner’s understanding of original public meaning was correct. Had
Congressional majorities at day one began the process of emancipating all
slaves in the United States or Fredonia, the point of the constitutional
bargains over slavery would be defeated. Both regimes would have fallen
apart almost immediately.
Original intentions/expectations treat ratifiers as political actors with
political purposes. Kay writes, “Legal obligations arise because we
recognize law-making authority vested in certain human beings.”22 What
matters is what these political actors think they are doing when they draft
and ratify constitutional texts. Persons can achieve political goals
constitutionally only through communication. Nevertheless, when
implementing constitutional and other political texts, priority should be
given to what the ratifiers were consciously trying to achieve rather than to
what they may have accidentally communicated. If Fredonians intended
their constitution to provide an effective impeachment process, disable
Congress from immediately prohibiting the slave trade, and grant states
immunity from private lawsuits for monetary damages, those expectations
should guide how the Constitution of Fredonia should be implemented at
day one. “[I]t is hard to see,” Kay writes, “what the political rationale
would be for a theory that elevates a text for reasons unrelated to the
people and circumstances which created it.”23
Original public meaning at day one replaces politics with etymology.
Rather than ask what people thought they were doing when they drafted
and ratified constitutional provisions, those who champion original public
meaning turn to linguistic theory when determining who presides over the
trial of an impeached Vice President, whether Congress may ban the
21
See generally Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth
Amendment: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of Interpretation, 28 PAC. L.J. 977 (1997) (discussing
Lysander Spooner’s theory that slavery was unconstitutional before the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment).
22
Kay, supra note 12, at 232.
23
Id. at 234.
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interstate slave trade, and the conditions over which persons can sue states
for monetary damages. Lawrence Solum, the leading champion of public
meaning originalism, maintains “the communicative content of the
constitutional text was fixed at the time each provision was framed and
ratified”24 and “that the original meaning of the constitutional text should
constrain constitutional practice.”25 One problem with this substitution is
that constitutional decision makers lack the knowledge necessary to
evaluate a contested theory of meaning. The more important problem is
that what might constitute interpretation in other enterprises should not
govern what constitutes interpretation in political enterprises.
Constitutional decision makers lack the expertise to determine the
merits of the linguistic theory underlying original public meanings. Solum
insists that, while context matters, we can determine the communicative
content of a constitutional provision independently from the intentions of
the persons responsible for that text.26 We can determine the meaning of
“interstate commerce” with only minimal attention to other constitutional
provisions and the overall structure of the Constitution.27 Kay disagrees,28
as does Lawrence Lessig.29 Lessig insists that constitutional provisions do
not have meaning independent of other constitutional provisions and the
overall structure of the text. The commerce clause is part of a
Wittgensteinian language game,30 and cannot be understood in absence of
all elements of the constitutional language game.31 Lessig writes,
The question of the commerce clause’s
determined on its own. It is instead read
necessary-and-proper clause . . . in light of
principle about implied limits on the
“enumerated constitution.”32

power is not
along with the
a more general
scope of an

Whether this is a correct understanding of Wittgenstein is beside the
point. Constitutional decision makers who at day one know their conscious
public intentions when ratifying the constitution have no basis for choosing

24

Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 13, at 7.
Id. at 1.
26
Id. at 27–29.
27
See id. (distinguishing between original intentions and original public meaning).
28
Kay, supra note 12, at 229–30.
29
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 191 (2019).
30
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 11–12 (G.E.M. Anscome trans.,
Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 3d ed. 1958) (1953).
31
On this point, see generally Ian C. Bartrum, Wittgenstein’s Poker: Contested Constitutionalism
and the Limits of Public Meaning Originalism, 10 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 29 (2017).
32
LESSIG, supra note 29, at 46.
25
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between interpretations of Wittgenstein or some other philosopher when
determining whether the original public meaning of the words they used is
not consistent with the constitutional expectations/intentions.
Kay and others recognize that the constitutional rules for the
impeachment process, the constitutional status of slavery, and the
constitutionality of suing unconsenting states for monetary damages cannot
possibly turn on the dominant understanding of “interpret” in
contemporary linguistic theory.34 Common sense belies claims that
whether someone ought to be executed, whether the President can torture
suspected terrorists, and whether Congress may require healthy persons to
buy life insurance depends, even in part, on the proper interpretation and
evaluation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.35 Proponents of
original meaning go awry by beginning with a generalized theory of
interpretation and then asking whether that theory of interpretation should
constrain constitutional decision makers.36 Kay and other constitutional
theorists adopt the better approach. They first consider how a constitution
should be implemented and then describe their best conclusions or all
plausible conclusions as “interpretation.”37 This approach is consistent with
the meaning of “interpret” in constitutional practice. Supreme Court
opinions routinely use “interpret” in ways inconsistent with originalist
theory.38 Philip Bobbitt describes six different methodologies for
determining the meaning of constitutional provisions only one of which is
related to original public meaning.39 Original intentions and original
expectations are more important than original public meanings when
interpreting political documents because those documents are designed to
bring about consciously intended results and expectations rather than
communicate certain meanings that framers may not have been aware of at
the moment of ratification. No one should care whether poetic
interpretation is as dependent on original intentions or expectations. The
33

See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
479, 489–90 (2013) (relying heavily on Paul Grice, even as he acknowledges “significant” differences
in their accounts of meaning).
34
See, e.g., Kay, supra note 12, at 289 (claiming contemporary majority opinions are not reflected
in the original intentions of drafters).
35
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 30.
36
See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 13, at 1–2 (distinguishing between a theory of
meaning and a theory of constitutional “constraint”).
37
Kay, supra note 12, at 231–32.
38
See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963 (2019) (referring to “a longstanding
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause”); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019)
(discussing the approach of “understanding statutory interpretation as a ‘holistic endeavor’ which
determines meaning by looking not to isolated words, but to text in context, along with purpose and
history”).
39
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1982). See, e.g.,
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (continuing the arguments made in
BOBBITT, supra).
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role of original intentions or expectations and original public meanings in
poetry depends on the nature and purposes of poetry rather than on some
universal standard for determining what should be called “interpretation”
in all human endeavors.40
Rule of law values favor interpreting constitutional provisions at day
one consistently with their original intentions/expectations. The rule of law
is desirable, commentators point out, because stable law enables people to
plan. Frederick Schauer explains,
Arguments for rule-based decision-making have traditionally
focused on the ability of rules to foster the interrelated virtues
of reliance, predictability, and certainty. According to such
arguments, decision-makers who follow rules even when
other results appear preferable enable those affected to
predict in advance what the decisions are likely to be.
Consequently, those affected by the decisions of others can
plan their activities more successfully under a regime of rules
than under more particularistic decision-making.41
Ratifiers plan on the basis of their conscious intentions and
expectations. Fredonian voters anticipate that impeached officeholders will
not preside over the Senate trial that determines whether to convict an
impeached officer. Fredonian slave holders commit to union on the
assumption that Congress will not immediately ban the international slave
trade or prohibit slavery altogether. States make fiscal plans confident they
cannot be sued for monetary damages.
Ratifiers do not plan on the basis of original public meanings when
those meanings diverge from their conscious public intentions or
expectations. No one can be wrong about or unaware of their conscious
intentions or expectations, but people can be mistaken or unaware of the
original public meaning of a constitutional provision. Fredonians may not
have read the Constitution with sufficient care to realize that Article I
mandates that the Vice President presides when the Senate determines
whether to impeach a convicted Vice President. Fredonian slaveholders
may simply have taken members of the ratifying convention at that their
word when they declared “the Constitution gives the national government
40

These constitutional practitioners are unlikely to accept interpretation by the discernment of
original public meaning and debate whether original public meaning should constrain constitutional
decision-making. There is a strong sense that the persons responsible for implementing a constitution
should interpret that constitution. Calling a process “interpretation,” in this sense, is a powerful
argument for legitimacy. For this reason, rather than decide what constitutes interpretation first, we
should consider how the constitution should be implemented and describe our best conclusion or all
plausible conclusions “interpretations.”
41
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 137–38 (1991).
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42

no power to emancipate slaves.” When ratifiers are aware of a divergence
between their original intentions/expectations and the original public
meaning of a constitutional provision, they will plan on the basis of their
original expectations. Fredonian state officials who believe assurances that,
despite what appears to be the plain meaning of Article III, states will
enjoy immunity from private suits for monetary damages43 will budget
consistently with the anticipated immunity.
Original intentions/expectations capture what citizens debate when
constitutions are framed and ratified, at least in the United States. Consider
several of The Federalist’s greatest hits.
•

“Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it
to discover their own strength and act in unison with
each other.”44

•

“A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the
members of Congress than a national spirit will prevail in
the legislatures of the particular States.”45

•

“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The
interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place.”46

•

“[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution . . . .”47

These claims are all predictions about what would happen should the
Constitution be ratified. Nowhere in the Federalist Papers do Hamilton,
Madison, or Jay explore the original public meaning of the commerce
clause or any other provision that has been the subject of interpretive
controversy for the past two centuries. Hamilton asked, “What is the
liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave
42
See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 286 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1974) (quoting Charles Cotesworth Pinckney:
“We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them, for no such authority is
granted”).
43
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining that states have sovereign immunity from lawsuits).
44
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
45
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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48

the utmost latitude for evasion?”
Many Federalists described
constitutional restrictions on government, standing alone, as “parchment
barriers.”49 Anti-Federalists leaned as heavily on expectations rather than
on analyses of original public meaning. When Brutus declared, “[t]he
judicial power will operate to effect . . . an entire subversion of the
legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states,”50 he was
making a prediction based largely on his belief that federal judges “will be
interested in using this latitude of interpretation.”51
The debate over the Equal Rights Amendment illustrates how
Americans consider expectations rather than public meanings when
deciding whether to ratify short constitutional amendments. Jane Mansfield
details how the proponents and opponents of the ERA considered whether
that amendment would compel single-sex bathrooms, abortion, and women
in the military.52 Few discussions outside the law reviews analyzed the
public meaning of the phrase: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex.”53
More often, debaters made predictions about how various governing
institutions would interpret those words.54 In particular, Mansbridge notes
how much of the debate centered on how the Supreme Court would likely
implement the ERA.55 She initially favored influencing future Supreme
Court decisions by “creating a legislative history that made clear
Congress’s assumption that the ERA would not require the military to
assign women draftees to combat on the same basis as men.”56
Conservatives, Mansbridge notes, “feared that the Supreme Court would
use the ERA in a multitude of unforeseeable ways, just as it has used the
Fourteenth Amendment in ways no one foresaw when that amendment was
being debated in the 1860s.”57
Original intentions/expectations better capture how constitutions tend
to be ratified as wholes, at least in the United States. Jack Rakove points
out that Americans in 1787–89 voted on the entire Constitution, not on

48

THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights:
The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 362–63 (2007) (“Structural considerations
trumped parchment barriers in 1787.”).
50
Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 420 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
51
Id. at 421.
52
See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 61–63, 84–89, 90–91, 112–13 (1986)
(discussing the concerns of proponents and opponents of the ERA regarding its interpretation).
53
Id. at 61.
54
Id. at 60.
55
Id. at 52, 60, 89.
56
Id. at 89.
57
Id. at 53.
49
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58

particular provisions. Article VII was designed to require “the state
conventions to approve or reject the Constitution as a whole—not to ratify
it in parts.”59 Federalists insisted the “imbecility”60 of continued
governance under the Articles of Confederation made ratification
imperative.61 They pointed to all the luminaries who helped frame the
text.62 Neither ratification strategy was conducive to considered reflection
on the public meaning of constitutional provisions. Debate, even in state
conventions that considered the Constitution provision by provision,
centered on how the different parts of the Constitution would interact to
produce a regime. Federalists and Anti-Federalists were far more
concerned with expectations as to who would implement the Constitution
than with the correct interpretation of constitutional language.63 Americans
debated whether the Constitution would establish an aristocracy or
promote rule by the virtuous.64 Slaveholders worried about southern
control over national institutions.65 Alexander Hamilton spoke for all these
constituencies in Federalist 31 when he declared, “all observations
founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the
composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of
its powers.”66
The American experience with ratification provides strong foundations
for interpreting the Constitution on day one, consistently with original
intentions/expectations when original intentions/expectations diverge from
original public meanings. Americans, when debating the Constitution and
subsequent constitutional amendments, spend more energy debating
predictions about how constitutional provisions will be interpreted than on
the correct interpretation of those provisions. They follow Hamilton and
worry more about the institutions that implement constitutional provisions
than the proper interpretation of the text. Many persons responsible for
constitutions and constitutional amendments make decisions on the basis
of who supports ratification and what they have been told are the
consequences of ratification, rather than on a close reading of the text. To
58
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 106 (1996).
59
Id.
60
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61
RAKOVE, supra note 58, at 188–89.
62
Id. at 135–37.
63
For the general contours of the debate, see id. at 131–60; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE
FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 397–545 (2016).
64
See 1 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS
WERE FOR 38–52 (1981) (discussing opposing perspectives of the Anti-Federalists and Federalists).
65
See GRABER, DRED SCOTT, supra note 8, at 101–06 (discussing Southern interests in protecting
slavery through the political process, “proponents of slavery were nationalists whenever they thought
uniform federal legislation more likely than diverse state laws to serve Southern interests”).
66
THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton).
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move back to Fredonia, the following considerations suggest that if
Fredonians ratified a constitution in part because they expected the Vice
President would not preside when the Senate was considering impeaching
a convicted Vice President, Congress would not immediately ban the
international slave trade; states would be immune from private lawsuits for
monetary damages; and the Supreme Court would not require women to be
sent into combat. This would suggest popular sovereignty and common
sense both favor interpreting the constitution consistently with what people
thought they were doing when they ratified the text than with what
linguistic theory informs the people of Fredonia the words of the
Constitution of Fredonia actually mean.
II. ORIGINAL INTENTIONS/EXPECTATIONS AND ORIGINAL PUBLIC
MEANING AT DAY TEN
Original intentions/expectations and original public meaning both over
time become less attractive means for interpreting and implementing
constitutions. As the temporal distance from ratification increases,
alternative methods of constitutional interpretation become plausible.
These alternatives better focus constitutional decision makers on
appropriate questions for determining whether to execute murderers or
allow Congress to pass a national health plan than either original
intentions/expectations or original public meanings. Doctrinalism better
guarantees the rule of law than any method of originalism. Various forms
of purposivism better enable constitutional decision makers to respond to
unanticipated constitutional developments. Original intentions/expectations
has the virtue of asking an important question: is the constitution
functioning as intended/expected? But it cannot provide answers to that
question or questions about how the constitution should be implemented
when important constitutional institutions and practices are not functioning
as intended/expected.
Americans, Fredonians, and other members of constitutional regimes
gain additional interpretive opinions over time. Constitutional decision
makers create precedents. These precedents sometimes fill gaps in original
intentions/expectations/public meanings. Other precedents are inconsistent
with original intentions/expectations/public meanings. These developments
make doctrinalism possible at day ten. As gap-filling and inconsistent
precedents accrue, constitutional decision makers must decide to remain
originalists, committed to original intentions/expectations/public meanings,
or become doctrinalists, committed to abiding by longstanding practice.
Concepts and conceptions diverge. Citizens who at the time of ratification
agreed that capital punishment was not cruel and unusual punishment may
now conclude that capital punishment is cruel and unusual. Constitutional
institutions do not function as expected. Citizens who anticipated that
elected officials would be loyal to their home institution must decide how
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to implement separation of powers principles when governing officials
become more loyal to members of their party.67 These, and related
unforeseen developments, make purposivism possible at day ten. As
regimes change in ways unanticipated by the persons responsible for the
constitution, constitutional decision makers must decide whether to remain
originalists, committed to interpreting the constitution only in light of
developments foreseen or accounted for by the persons who framed the
constitution, or become purposivists, committed to finding ways to achieve
original constitutional ends in light of unexpected constitutional
developments.
Common sense dictates that at day ten who presides over the Senate
trial of an impeached Vice President, congressional power to ban the
interstate slave trade, and state immunity from private suits for monetary
damages should not depend on what an historian finds in an old attic. What
prominent historians believe to be the original intentions or expectations
and original public meanings of constitutional provisions changes over
time. Some changes reflect better history or better historical methods.
Other changes, most notably changes in the historiography of the
post-Civil War Amendments, reflect ideological changes that influence the
conclusions historians reach on originalism and what counts as evidence of
original intentions, expectations, or public meanings.68 Even if
constitutional decision makers professing history do not simply pick their
favorite historians when making constitutional decisions,69 the history of
history suggests no ideologically neutral history exists that achieves
originalism’s promise of stable meanings rooted in objective facts.70
67

See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312, 2324–25 (2006) (“[I]n the broad run of cases . . . party is likely to be the single best
predictor of political agreement and disagreement.”).
68
See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 1 (1999) (describing how “[t]he competition to interpret
Reconstruction history involves issues of race, rights, and national identity”); Randall Kennedy,
Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521, 521 (1989) (arguing that what
“cements” the linkage between the Reconstruction period to the present is the “belief that ‘original
intent’ should play an important, if not decisive, role in determining how statutes and constitutional
provisions are applied”). This process of historical reconstruction rooted in present concerns began
almost immediately after ratification. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 3 (2018).
69
See Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 70, 70 (Earl M. Matlz ed., 2003) (describing that
Justice Thomas’s originalism does not exhibit “the virtues claimed for originalism in theory” and
would “dishearten proponents of that historical approach to constitutional interpretation or the judicial
function”).
70
See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL PROFESSION 1 (1988) (arguing that “[h]istorical objectivity is not a single idea, but rather a
sprawling collection of assumptions, attitudes, aspirations, and antipathies” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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Moreover, no one has suggested a good reason why Fredonians or anyone
else at day ten should abandon longstanding practices simply because
historians have uncovered manuscripts that seem to prove that
longstanding doctrine, broadly thought to be rooted in original intentions,
expectations, or public meaning is, in fact, inconsistent with what the
framers intended or expected and the original public meaning of
constitutional language.
Doctrinalism at day ten better captures the rule of law values
underlying constitutionalism than any version of originalism. Persons who
at day one are more likely to be aware and plan on original intentions or
expectations than original public meanings over time are more likely to be
aware of and plan on longstanding precedents than original intentions or
expectations. Journalists are more likely to be aware of the actual malice
rule announced by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan71 than what the framers
thought about the constitutional status of libel law. Speakers who believe a
divergence exists between longstanding precedent and original intentions
or expectations are likely to plan on the Supreme Court continuing to
follow longstanding precedent, either because the Justices are doctrinalists
or because the Justices are not likely to be persuaded to abandon mistaken
beliefs that longstanding precedent is consistent with the original
constitutional understanding of libel law.72 Aspiring writers seeking to
avoid paying monetary damages can discover the contemporary status of
libel law by reading the United States Reports. No one can plan on the
basis of George Washington’s presently unknown journal of the
constitutional convention, buried deep in the walls of Mount Vernon,
which, when discovered, will reveal the definitive account of the original
public meaning, intention, or expectation of federal power to regulate false
statements about public officials.
Some version of living constitutionalism and the Dworkian distinction
between concepts and conceptions at day ten better captures the framing
concern for a functional constitution than any version of originalism.
Constitutions at day one are more likely to secure their animating purposes
by being implemented consistently with their original intentions or
expectations rather than being implemented consistently with their original
public meaning over time because they are being implemented in the ways
that best achieve those purposes in light of unforeseen developments,
instead of being implemented in ways framers who did not anticipate those
71
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (declaring that the First Amendment “prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’”).
72
No justice even responded when Justice Thomas called on the Supreme Court to rethink
Sullivan in light of the original understanding of free speech. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
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developments thought best. Constitutions are means for coordinating
political activity, maintaining stable rule, fostering deliberative
government, promoting national aspirations, and establishing the
compromises that enable people with different values to share the same
civic space.73 Ratifiers believe that a constitution implemented consistently
with their original intentions or expectations will achieve those
constitutional purposes only in light of shared assumptions about future
developments. The constitutional compromises over slavery were rooted in
widespread beliefs that slaveholders would always control at least one
branch of the national government.74 The Civil War Amendments were
rooted in expectations that a united antislavery Republican Party would
control the national government for the foreseeable future.75 The problem
at day ten is that time dashes many framing expectations. Westward
expansion fueled an unanticipated and dramatic increase in free state
population.76 The Republican Party became less powerful and less
committed to racial equality after Americans ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment.77 In these circumstances, framing purposes could no longer
be achieved by the means the framers thought would achieve those ends; a
united south after 1860 lacked the power to veto anti-slavery legislation.78
The Republican Party after 1876 no longer had the popular support or
inclination to pass legislation protecting persons of color.79 If, as original
intentions/expectations maintain, framing purposes at day one should take
priority when implementing the constitution, then constitutional decision
makers should abandon original intentions/expectations at day ten when
those intentions/expectations under changed circumstances are more likely
to frustrate than achieve constitutional purposes.
Consider a topical example of an instance when original constitutional
means may subvert original constitutional purposes. Many framers may
have preferred a narrowly defined impeachment clause because they feared
legislators might invoke impeachment to bend a weaker executive to their
will.80 The more vital constitutional problem at present is that Presidents

73
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acting as near constitutional dictators may be enfeebling legislatures.81
Interpreting the impeachment clause with a bias against legislative power
will likely have perverse effects in a regime in which the executive is far
more powerful and Congress far weaker than the framers anticipated. Plain
constitutional language may not be interpreted away. Nevertheless, given
the historic flexibility of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors,”82 the
better view may be to give Congress more leeway than the framers might
have to determine when and whether a President is unfit for office.
A constitutional focus on original intentions or expectations is
nevertheless vital for thinking about maintaining constitutional regimes.
Constitutional regimes consist of a set of values, a set of institutions
designed to achieve those purposes, and a people who are presumed to
share those values and know how to operate those institutions.83 The most
fundamental question for implementing a constitution over time is whether
constitutional institutions when functioning normally still achieve
constitutional values, whether the people still share those values and
whether the people can operate the constitutional machinery in ways that
achieve those values. Original intentions/expectations is the starting point
for such analysis even if that alpha is not the alpha and omega.
CONCLUSION
Implementing a constitution at day ten requires a robust account of
original intentions or expectations that incorporates the complex “web of
beliefs”84 that explain why different Americans supported ratifying the
Constitution. Some beliefs were about particular results. The framers
expected that the Vice President would not preside over the trial of an
impeached Vice President and that slave trade would not be banned at day
one. Other beliefs concerned very general values. The framers were
“dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”85 The persons
responsible for the Constitution had other beliefs at varying levels of
generality. They believed free speech was an element of republican
81
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government and that states enjoyed some measure of sovereignty. As
important, Americans in 1787 had beliefs about the nature of politics and
future developments that help explain why they thought the institutions
they had designed would have achieved the expected results. They
expected that national politics would be less partisan than local politics.86
They expected population shifts would maintain the balance of power
between free and slave states.87 To add further complication, no two
ratifiers based their support of the Constitution on identical belief systems.
Some belief systems that supported ratification were very different from
other belief systems that supported ratification. South Carolinians ratified a
constitution that they anticipated would be far more pro-slavery than the
constitution ratified in New Hampshire.88
Persons implementing a constitution cannot maintain this web of
beliefs, intentions, expectations, and public meanings in pristine form.
Living originalists and others point out that over time constitutional
decision makers regard as incoherent what appeared to the framers to be a
fairly consistent belief system.89 As important, constitutional decision
makers over time realize that the empirical foundations of the Constitution
have crumbled. National politics is as partisan as local politics. Population
is moving northwestward instead of the anticipated southwestern direction.
The Constitution in these circumstances cannot be operated in pristine
form. Severe constitutional failures are likely to occur should constitutional
decision makers attempt to operate in pristine form a constitution designed
on the assumption that national politics would be less partisan than local
politics when national politics is more partisan than local politics. The
Civil War resulted when Americans could not adjust original constitutional
practices in light of unexpected demographic changes to meet the more
vital goal of maintaining national unity.90
The constitutional status of George Washington highlights the
relevance and irrelevance of original intentions, or expectations, for
86
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constitutional decision making at day ten. The framers expected George
Washington to be the first President. Members of the constitutional
convention allocated presidential power in part on the assumption that
Washington would be elected. Charles Thach observed, “that the first
President was to be Washington had an undoubted effect. When men spoke
of the great national representative, of the guardian of the people, they
were thinking in terms of the Father of His Country.”91 Pierce Butler, a
delegate to the framing convention, maintained that executive powers
“would not have been so great had not many of the members cast their eyes
toward General Washington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the
Powers to be given a President, by their opinions of his Virtue.”92 No one
thinks that these expectations gave Washington a constitutional right to be
elected. Nevertheless, granting future Presidents, most notably Donald
Trump, the powers the framers expected to be wielded by someone with
Washington’s character and abilities may subvert rather than sustain the
constitutional order.93
Professor Kay has made a vital contribution to constitutional
scholarship by his dogged efforts to keep original intentions alive. His
work reminds us that constitutions are political texts that constitutional
decision makers should interpret and implement consistently with their
animating political ends. Original intentions/expectations at day one avoids
making linguistic theory the arbiter of important constitutional questions.
Professor Kay correctly insists we keep constitutional attention on what
people were doing when they ratified the Constitution and what they
expected to be the fruits of their labor rather than on public meanings that
many framers may not have considered. Original intentions/expectations at
day ten highlights the many contemporary constitutional debates that are
consequences of constitutional failures to perform as expected. The
challenge constitutional decision makers face in the twenty-first century is
finding the interpretive strategies that enable the Constitution to be
implemented in ways that best serve the animating purposes of that text
and subsequent amendments. This Essay joins Professor Kay’s
distinguished efforts to put politics back into constitutional interpretation at
day one, even as he would disagree strongly with my account of
constitutional politics at day ten.
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